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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—STATUTORY INTERPRETATION—AVOIDING 
THE UNAVOIDABLE: THE CANON OF CONSTITUTIONAL AVOIDANCE AS 
APPLIED TO THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT. 
National Federation of Independent Businesses v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 
(2012). 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In upholding the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“Afford-
able Care Act”),1 Chief Justice Roberts seemingly invoked a well-
established canon of statutory interpretation in his majority opinion: the 
canon of constitutional avoidance, which dictates that the Court should read 
a statute in order to avoid a constitutional question wherever possible. In 
applying the canon, however, the Chief Justice performed the rather strange 
step of first addressing the exact constitutional question he used the canon to 
avoid. This note seeks the answer to the question whether the Chief Justice 
properly applied the canon to the Affordable Care Act.2 Ultimately, the note 
determines that the Chief Justice did not apply the avoidance canon but in-
stead utilized a very similar method to address a situation that the avoidance 
canon could not. 
Part II focuses on the canon itself, first looking at the historical devel-
opment, then defining the canon as it currently exists, and finally looking at 
some recent history of the canon’s use in order to ascertain the current 
Court’s understanding of the canon before National Federation of Inde-
pendent Businesses v. Sebelius (“NFIB v. Sebelius”)3 and particularly Chief 
Justice Roberts’s ability to properly apply the canon.  
In Part III, the note turns to an analysis of Chief Justice Roberts’s invo-
cation and use of the canon in NFIB v. Sebelius, first looking at the defini-
tion the Chief Justice gave to the canon, then to his application of the canon 
to the Affordable Care Act. 
  
 1. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of titles 5, 
18, 20, 21, 25, 26, 28–31, 35, 36, and 42 of the United States Code). 
 2. This note does not, however, seek to defend or attack the avoidance canon. Criticism 
of the avoidance canon, as well as defenses of its propriety, are the subject of many other 
works, some cited within this note. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation—in 
the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L REV. 800, 815–16 (1983); Note, Should 
the Supreme Court Presume That Congress Acts Constitutionally? The Role of the Canon of 
Avoidance and Reliance on Early Legislative Practice in Constitutional Interpretation, 116 
HARV. L. REV. 1798 (2003). This note limits itself to the simple question of whether Chief 
Justice Roberts used the canon correctly. 
 3. 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
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Part IV compares Chief Justice Roberts’s application of the canon to 
historical applications, asking whether the Chief Justice actually avoided a 
constitutional issue by invoking the canon and whether the unique situation 
faced by the Chief Justice demanded a different type of answer than prece-
dent provided. This section also includes a discussion of Justice Scalia’s and 
Justice Ginsburg’s opinions and their criticisms of Chief Justice Roberts’s 
analysis. 
In Part V, this note considers whether Chief Justice Roberts may have 
created a new canon of statutory interpretation or perhaps a variant of the 
avoidance canon. This possible new species of statutory interpretation may 
provide a guide for interpreting statutes when all possible interpretations 
involve serious constitutional questions rather than the single question that 
the canon most often addresses.  
II. THE BACKGROUND AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE AVOIDANCE CANON 
As a well-established canon of statutory interpretation, the avoidance 
canon has a long history and has had an important impact on many Supreme 
Court decisions. This section of the note first briefly looks at the historic 
development of the canon, then analyzes the canon itself to understand its 
proper application. Finally, the note examines briefly a few important recent 
cases, particularly two cases in which the Chief Justice discussed the avoid-
ance canon and its application, establishing the status of the avoidance can-
on prior to NFIB v. Sebelius. 
A. A Brief History of the Avoidance Canon 
The avoidance canon has its roots deep in the jurisprudential history of 
the United States.4 The Supreme Court has noted5 that Justice Marshall 
planted the seed for the canon in Murray v. The Charming Betsy, where the 
Court observed “that an act of Congress ought never to be construed to vio-
late the law of nations if any other possible construction remains.”6 Even so, 
the Court evoked a similar idea even earlier, holding in 1800 that “the 11th 
section of the judiciary act can, and must, receive a construction, consistent 
with the constitution.”7  
The pedigree of the avoidance canon has not prevented some degree of 
development in the Court’s construction of the canon. The Supreme Court 
  
 4. Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 
U.S. 568, 575 (1988). 
 5. Id. 
 6. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804). 
 7. Mossman v. Higginson, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 12, 14 (1800). 
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has utilized both a classical and a modern version of the avoidance canon.8 
Justice Holmes articulated the classical version of the canon9 when he stated 
that “as between two possible interpretations of a statute, by one of which it 
would be unconstitutional and by the other valid, our plain duty is to adopt 
that which will save the Act.”10 The modern version of the avoidance canon 
owes its origin11 to United States ex rel. Attorney General v. Delaware & 
Hudson Co.12 The Court in Delaware & Hudson stated the principles of 
avoidance as follows: 
It is elementary when the constitutionality of a statute is assailed, if the 
statute be reasonably susceptible of two interpretations, by one of which 
it would be unconstitutional and by the other valid, it is our plain duty to 
adopt that construction which will save the statute from constitutional in-
firmity. And unless this rule be considered as meaning that our duty is to 
first decide that a statute is unconstitutional, and then proceed to hold 
that such ruling was unnecessary because the statute is susceptible of a 
meaning which causes it not to be repugnant to the Constitution, the rule 
plainly must mean that where a statute is susceptible of two construc-
tions, by one of which grave and doubtful constitutional questions arise 
and by the other of which such questions are avoided, our duty is to 
adopt the latter.13 
This move toward modern avoidance seems to relate to the Court’s ret-
icence to render advisory opinions,14 as the classical version of the avoid-
ance canon required the Court to address the actual issue of whether a par-
ticular interpretation ran afoul of the Constitution before adopting the saving 
construction.15 In opinions utilizing the classical avoidance canon, the Court 
would first determine that the challenged reading of a statute resulted in a 
constitutional violation and would then announce an interpretation of the 
statute that would cure the defect.16 Such opinions certainly carry the scent 
of advisory opinions, as they answer the constitutional question only to then 
  
 8. Trevor Morrison, Constitutional Avoidance in the Executive Branch, 106 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1189, 1202–03 (2006); Adrian Vermeule, Saving Constructions, 15 GEO. L.J. 1945, 
1949 (1997). 
 9. Morrison, supra note 8, at 1202. 
 10. Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 148 (1927) (Holmes, J., concurring). 
 11. Morrison, supra note 8, at 1204. 
 12. U.S. ex rel. Attorney General v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366 (1909). 
 13. Id. at 407–08 (citations omitted).  
 14. Morrison, supra note 8, at 1204–05. 
 15. Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 395–96 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Vermeule, 
supra note 7, at 1949. 
 16. John Copeland Nagle, Delaware & Hudson Revisited, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1495, 1499–1503 (1997) (providing examples and summaries of decisions of the Court ap-
plying the classical avoidance canon). 
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interpret the statute under consideration so as not to ask the very question 
previously decided.17  
After Delaware & Hudson, the Court has utilized the modern avoid-
ance canon, which Justice Brandeis famously defined in his concurrence in 
Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority.18 The Court has applied the mod-
ern avoidance canon in cases involving the construction of numerous stat-
utes. In one such application, the Court refused to answer whether section 
8(b)(4) of the National Labor Relations Act violated the First Amendment 
by forbidding a union’s peaceful handbilling that could have negatively im-
pacted the business of mall tenants.19 The handbilling came as a result of a 
dispute between a union and a construction company hired to build a store 
within the same mall.20 Rather than addressing the serious question of 
whether the statute violated the First Amendment, the Court instead simply 
decided that the statute did not forbid the handbilling—altogether avoiding 
the First Amendment question.21  
The Court has also used the modern version of the canon to support a 
reading of a scienter requirement in a statute prohibiting the transportation 
and distribution of materials depicting minors engaged in sexually explicit 
conduct even though the statute did not explicitly refer to the violator’s 
knowledge of the performers’ age.22 The Court even noted that the most 
natural reading of the statute would not have applied the scienter require-
ment to the section of the statute regarding the age of the persons depicted in 
the explicit conduct.23 However, the Court determined that giving the lan-
guage of the statute such a construction would produce absurd results that 
Congress could not have intended, such as a Federal Express delivery per-
son facing liability for delivering such materials even though he had no idea 
what the film he delivered depicted.24 The Court thus avoided a constitution-
al analysis by interpreting the existing language of the statute in a manner it 
admitted to be unnatural.25 
At this point in history, the modern version of the avoidance canon has 
thoroughly supplanted the classical version.26 Knowing now which canon 
the Court applies in current cases, the next section will briefly examine the 
canon to determine the steps that the Court has followed in its application. 
  
 17. Id. at 1518. 
 18. 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
 19. Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 
U.S. 568, 570–73, 578 (1988). 
 20. Id. at 570–73, 578. 
 21. Id. at 578. 
 22. United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 67–68, 78 (1994). 
 23. Id. at 68–69. 
 24. Id. at 69. 
 25. Id. at 78. 
 26. Nagle, supra note 16, at 1497. 
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B. Defining the Avoidance Canon 
Justice Brandeis gave the most famous explanation of the modern 
avoidance canon in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority.27 In that opin-
ion, Justice Brandeis enumerated several rules that the Court has used to 
avoid answering constitutional questions,28 but he specifically addressed the 
modern avoidance canon in stating that “if a case can be decided on either of 
two grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other a question of 
statutory construction or general law, the Court will decide only the latter.”29 
The Ashwander definition, however, does not include other pertinent 
language regarding the canon. Specifically, the Court has said that it will 
“construe [a] statute to avoid [constitutional] problems unless such construc-
tion is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress.”30 The Court has also stat-
ed that this qualification requires construing a statute as not presenting a 
constitutional question “if fairly possible.”31  
The Court has yet to explicitly define one aspect of the canon: the de-
gree of doubt that must exist regarding the constitutionality of the statute 
sufficient to trigger the canon’s application.32 While the standard articulation 
of the canon requires a “serious” question, different justices have articulated 
a wide range of threshold doubt levels required to invoke the canon,33 and 
Justice Breyer has stated that “the Court need not apply . . . the doctrine . . . 
where a constitutional question, while lacking an obvious answer, does not 
lead a majority to gravely doubt that the statute is constitutional.”34 These 
standards, ranging from interpretations that “would upset the constitutional 
balance” to those that “push the outer limits” of the constitution,35 do not 
clearly indicate just how serious a question the Court will require to invoke 
the canon—making it difficult to analyze the invocation for its propriety. 
  
 27. Id. at 1495. 
 28. Vermeule, supra note 8, at 1948. 
 29. Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concur-
ring). 
 30. Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 
U.S. 568, 575 (1988) (emphasis added). 
 31. Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 237 (1998) (quoting United 
States v. Jin Fuey Moy, 241 U.S. 394, 401 (1916)). 
 32. Anthony Vitarelli, Comment, Constitutional Avoidance Step Zero, 119 YALE L.J. 
837, 841–42 (2010). 
 33. Id. 
 34. Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 239. 
 35. Vitarelli, supra note 32, at 840–42 (quoting Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 291 
(2006) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991)). 
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Despite the doubtfulness of the triggering condition, the operation of 
the canon seems to follow a particular pattern:36 
1) First determine whether the proposed interpretation poses a serious 
constitutional question. 
2) Then determine whether a different type of inquiry can address the 
controversy without addressing the constitutional question. 
3) Determine whether there exists a construction of the statute that will 
satisfy that inquiry and thus avoid the constitutional question. 
4) Determine whether the proposed alternative construction is not plainly 
contrary to the legislative intent of Congress. 
5) If steps one through four are answered in the affirmative, apply the 
canon to avoid the constitutional question. 
These steps apply only to the modern avoidance canon. The classical 
formulation of the avoidance canon would have a different first step, in 
which the Court would determine that the interpretation of the statute would 
actually violate the Constitution rather than simply determining that the in-
terpretation raises a serious question.37 
The Supreme Court has not explicitly recognized the preliminary step 
of determining whether a serious constitutional question exists,38 and the 
Court has not followed a rigid step by step method of applying the canon as 
identified. This breakdown merely serves to highlight specific inquiries that 
a court must make in properly applying the avoidance canon to a particular 
statute. These steps will provide an analytical framework for addressing 
Chief Justice Roberts’s application of the canon in NFIB v. Sebelius. 
C. Recent Applications of the Canon  
Having established the contours of the modern avoidance canon, this 
note will now turn to recent uses of the canon, particularly those to which 
Chief Justice Roberts offered an analysis. 
The Court discussed the avoidance canon in Clark v. Martinez, holding 
that a limitation placed in a previous case on the length of time that remova-
  
 36. See generally Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); 
Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 224 (1998); Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast 
Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 568 (1988); Vitarelli, supra note 32; infra 
Part II.C.. These opinions do not provide an exact breakdown of the method of analysis used 
for an avoidance canon problem, and the pattern described here is extrapolated from analysis 
of these opinions and other works. 
 37. Vermeule, supra note 8, at 1949. 
 38. Vitarelli, supra note 32, at 842. 
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ble aliens could be held would also apply to the length of time that inadmis-
sible aliens could be held.39 The Court, per Justice Scalia, observed that the 
canon offers “a means of giving effect to congressional intent, not subvert-
ing it.”40 While the Court in Clark did not per se invoke the avoidance can-
on, the canon played a large role in its decision, as the limitation on holding 
periods that the Court addressed owed their origin to a previous case that 
invoked the canon.41 The Court did note that if an interpretation “would 
raise a multitude of constitutional problems, the other [interpretation] should 
prevail—whether or not those constitutional problems pertain to the litigant 
before the Court.”42 This caveat does not seem to indicate that the Court 
meant to encourage advisory opinions, merely that in construing a statute, “a 
court must consider the necessary consequences of its choice.”43 
Chief Justice Roberts authored the majority opinion in a more recent 
case in which the outcome turned in its entirety upon the application of the 
avoidance canon. In Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District Number 
One v. Holder (NAMUDNO), a utility district sought a bailout from the re-
quirement of section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, requiring it to seek 
preclearance from federal authorities before making any changes regarding 
the election of the district’s board, alternatively arguing that the statute was 
unconstitutional if the district could not bailout.44 In holding that the district 
could bailout under the provisions of the Voting Rights Act, the Court never 
once addressed the merits of the constitutional argument, acknowledging its 
duty to decide the case on different grounds if possible.45 Chief Justice Rob-
erts applied the avoidance canon precisely in NAMUDNO. By simply hold-
ing that the district could bailout from the preclearance requirement, the 
Court never found it necessary to discuss the constitutional claims.  
In NAMUDNO, the Court acknowledged in the first sentence of the 
opinion that the utility district raised a “big question” regarding the constitu-
tionality of the statute.46 This acknowledgment satisfies the first step of the 
avoidance canon’s application outlined in the previous section. The Court 
performed the second step of the analysis by determining that it could avoid 
the constitutional question if the utility district qualified for the bailout, in 
part because the utility district had pled for the constitutional relief in the 
alternative.47 In the third step of the analysis, the Court determined that if the 
  
 39. Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 377–78 (2005). 
 40. Id. at 382. 
 41. Id. at 377. 
 42. Id. at 380–81. 
 43. Id. at 380. 
 44. 557 U.S. 193, 200–01 (2009). 
 45. Id. at 205. 
 46. Id. at 196. 
 47. Id. at 205–06. 
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definition of a “political subdivision” could encompass the utility district, 
the district could qualify for a bailout, and the Court could thereby avoid the 
constitutional question.48 After determining that an interpretation existed 
that could avoid the constitutional question, the Court analyzed precedent 
and congressional intent to determine that interpreting the statute in the 
manner so described would not contradict the intent of Congress.49 Finding 
no obstacle in interpreting the statute in a manner that would avoid address-
ing the constitutional question, the Court applied the alternative interpreta-
tion, whereby the utility district could qualify for a bailout from the pre-
clearance requirement.50 The Court could therefore avoid the constitutional 
question, and the statute remained undisturbed. 
The NAMUDNO decision did have one critical flaw as regards its ap-
plication of the avoidance canon, as pointed out by Richard Hasen.51 The 
Chief Justice’s opinion made no mention of a plausibility requirement con-
cerning the reading that the Court applied to the statute.52 Hasen also has 
much to say regarding the Court’s decision to interpret the utility district as 
a political subdivision, noting particularly the lack of authority supporting 
the Court’s interpretation of the statute and the weight of authority suggest-
ing that the reading proffered by the Court seemed to result in an interpreta-
tion contrary to the intent of Congress.53 Nevertheless, the opinion carried 
the day with an eight-justice majority.54 Hasen’s argument principally seeks 
to unveil the Court’s reasons for invoking the avoidance canon; however, 
this note concerns only the Chief Justice’s understanding of the canon and 
his ability to utilize it. Clearly, Chief Justice Roberts managed to apply the 
avoidance canon in NAMUDNO with aplomb. His opinion neatly tracks the 
outlined application of the canon from the previous section of this note.55 
Despite criticisms based on the plausibility of the interpretation and the de-
sirability of that interpretation, the Chief Justice demonstrated in 
NAMUDNO the ability to apply the canon through a proper analytical and 
methodological framework.  
As Professor Hasen noted, the Chief Justice approved a different tactic 
in his concurrence in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission.56 
  
 48. Id. at 206–07. 
 49. Id. at 207–10. 
 50. Nw. Austin Mun. Utility Dist. No. One, 557 U.S. at 211. 
 51. Richard Hasen, Constitutional Avoidance and Anti-Avoidance by the Roberts Court, 
2009 SUP. CT. REV. 181, 203 (2009). 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 205–06. 
 54. Id. at 203. 
 55. See supra Part II.B. 
 56. Richard Hasen, Was Chief Justice Roberts Most Unprincipled in Applying the Doc-
trine of Constitutional Avoidance in the Health Care Case, in NAMUDNO (the Voting Rights 
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There, the Chief Justice explicitly rejected the dissent’s suggestion of adopt-
ing a statutory construction that would have avoided addressing the First 
Amendment issue.57 The Court rejected Citizens United’s argument that the 
challenged prohibition on corporate sponsorship of political communica-
tions did not apply to a video-on-demand broadcast of its documentary film 
Hillary: The Movie, which promulgated a message against Hillary Clinton 
during her run for the Democratic Presidential nomination in the 2008 pri-
mary elections.58 If the Court had interpreted the 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2) as 
not including video-on-demand services within the definition of electioneer-
ing communications, the Court would have had no need to address the ques-
tion of whether the statute violated the First Amendment.59 Finding it merit-
less, however, the Chief Justice and the majority rejected the invitation to 
interpret the statute in such a manner.60 The Court then rejected a proffered 
interpretation that would have found Hillary: The Movie to not qualify as 
“the functional equivalent of express advocacy,” which would also have 
permitted avoiding the constitutional question.61 Once the Court determined 
that no plausible reading could avoid the constitutional issue, only then did 
it turn to the First Amendment arguments.62 
Whatever criticisms Professor Hasen may have regarding the disingen-
uousness of the Chief Justice’s application of the avoidance canon,63 Chief 
Justice Roberts clearly understands the use of the avoidance canon and the 
method of its implementation. This skillful, direct application of the canon 
in NAMUDNO and Citizens United provides a stark contrast to the rather 
odd usage applied in NFIB v. Sebelius —to which this note now turns. 
III. CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS’S USE OF THE AVOIDANCE CANON IN NFIB V. 
SEBELIUS 
Having established the foundational and historical context of the 
avoidance canon, as well as Chief Justice Roberts’s skill in its use, this note 
now turns to an examination in NFIB v. Sebelius as it relates to the defini-
tion and application of the avoidance canon. Section A examines the expla-
nation the Chief Justice gave regarding the avoidance canon, while section 
  
Act Case) or in Citizens United?, ELECTION LAW BLOG (July 11, 2012, 9:57 PM), 
http://electionlawblog.org. 
 57. Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 373 (2010) (Roberts, 
C.J., concurring).  
 58. Id. at 887–89. 
 59. Hasen, supra note 56. 
 60. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 323. 
 61. Id. at 323–25. 
 62. Id. at 373 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). 
 63. Hasen, supra note 56. 
600 UALR LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35  
B looks to the application of the canon, as the Chief Justice defined it, to the 
language of the individual mandate. 
A. The Chief Justice’s Explanation of the Canon 
Chief Justice Roberts engaged in a very brief explanation of the avoid-
ance canon before conducting his analysis of the individual mandate as a 
tax.64 As he explained, “a law that reads ‘no vehicles in the park’ might, or 
might not, ban bicycles in the park.”65 Further, Roberts asserted that, in 
choosing between two interpretations of a statute, the Court should choose 
the interpretation that does not result in a violation of the Constitution.66 In 
fact, Roberts also asserts that the Court need not adopt “the most natural 
interpretation” but need only adopt a “fairly possible one.”67 
Roberts thus explains the canon first as a matter of semantic interpreta-
tion,68 then extends that explanation further, asserting that the Court should 
reach for any “fairly possible” interpretation in order to save a statute from 
unconstitutionality. Significantly, the Chief Justice’s explanation of the can-
on did not describe the idea of avoiding a constitutional question but rather 
described interpreting a statute in such a manner as to allow it to function 
constitutionally.69 The Chief Justice’s analysis seems to have more in com-
mon with the classical avoidance canon than with the modern one. 
The authorities cited by the Chief Justice in support of his explanation 
of the canon seem odd choices, as the cases almost all came prior to the de-
velopment of the modern avoidance canon in Delaware & Hudson.70 In fact, 
the Chief Justice cited to Justice Holmes’s explanation of the classical 
avoidance canon from Blodgett v. Holden.71 As noted above,72  Roberts has 
previously applied the modern avoidance canon without showing any sign 
of a misapprehension as to its effect or operation. His explanation of the 
canon here, relying on case law describing the classical version of the 
avoidance canon as opposed to the modern version, seems very strange in 
light of his previously established understanding. 
  
 64. NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2593–94 (2012).  
 65. Id. at 2593. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 2594. 
 68. I.e., whether the hypothetical statute barring vehicles in the park means in the use of 
the word “vehicle” to bar bicycles as well as automobiles.  
 69. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2593. 
 70. The Chief Justice cited to Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932); Blodgett v. Hold-
en, 275 U.S. 142 (1927); Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648 (1895); Parsons v. Bedford, 28 
U.S. 433 (1830). 
 71. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2593 (quoting Blodgett, 275 U.S. at 148 (Holmes, J., concur-
ring)). 
 72. See supra Part II.C. 
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B. The Chief Justice’s Application of the Avoidance Canon to the Afford-
able Care Act Mandate 
The text of the relevant portions of the individual mandate, 42 U.S.C § 
5000A(a), (b)(1), to which Chief Justice Roberts applied the avoidance can-
on, reads as follows: 
(a) Requirement to maintain minimum essential coverage. —An applica-
ble individual shall for each month beginning after 2013 ensure that the 
individual, and any dependent of the individual who is an applicable in-
dividual, is covered under minimum essential coverage for such month. 
(b) Shared responsibility payment.-- 
(1) In general.--If a taxpayer who is an applicable individual, or an appli-
cable individual for whom the taxpayer is liable under paragraph (3), 
fails to meet the requirement of subsection (a) for 1 or more months, 
then, except as provided in subsection (e), there is hereby imposed on the 
taxpayer a penalty with respect to such failures in the amount determined 
under subsection (c). 
In applying the avoidance canon to this language, the Chief Justice did 
not abrogate any of the effects of the statute but rather changed the charac-
terization of the Shared Responsibility Payment from a penalty to a tax.73 In 
fact, he considered the predicted operations of the statute in determining that 
the mandate fell within the tax power.74 Consequently, a taxpayer does not 
violate 42 U.S.C. § 5000A unless that taxpayer both fails to maintain cover-
age and fails to pay the Shared Responsibility Payment.75 
The Chief Justice’s opinion and application of the canon result in a 
strange anomaly regarding the effect of the interpretation on the operation of 
the statute. Even the authorities cited by Chief Justice Roberts in explaining 
his use of the avoidance canon did not result in a statute having the same 
practical effect, regardless of which interpretation of the statute the Court 
chose.76 In contrast, the Chief Justice’s application of the canon to the indi-
  
 73. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2601. 
 74. Id. at 2597. Chief Justice Roberts noted that Congress anticipated approximately 
four million people would opt to pay the penalty each year rather than purchase insurance. In 
considering this estimate, the Chief Justice “expect[ed] Congress to be troubled by that pro-
spect if such conduct were unlawful.” Id.  
 75. Id. 
 76. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932), involved a question as to whether a statute 
granted final fact-finding authority to the deputy commissioner of the United States Employ-
ees’ Compensation Commission for matters of jurisdiction relating to compensation claims, 
including the existence of an employer-employee relationship. The Court determined that the 
statute allowed a federal court to review the facts of employment to determine whether an 
award of compensation as “in accordance with the law,” as the statute did not specifically 
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vidual mandate results, not in a reading that allows the statute to function 
while restricting an unconstitutional extension, but rather has the same pre-
cise practical effect as if the Court had not applied the avoidance canon.77 
The oddness of this result did not escape commentators who criticized the 
Chief Justice for his invocation of the avoidance canon soon after the an-
nouncement of the decision.78 
Chief Justice Roberts’s insistence that he “would find no basis to adopt 
such a saving construction” without first deciding that the Commerce Clause 
did not authorize the mandate makes the opinion somewhat stranger.79 This 
calls back to his explanation of the avoidance canon, in which he never stat-
ed that the Court should not reach a constitutional question if an interpreta-
tion existed that would allow the Court to avoid the question altogether.80 
Once again, the Chief Justice seems to refer to something more like the clas-
sical avoidance canon, which requires a determination of the initial constitu-
tional question,81 than the modern avoidance canon. 
  
provide for the finality of the deputy commissioner’s determination. Id. at 62. Blodgett v. 
Holden, 275 U.S. 142 (1927), involved a determination of whether a new tax on inter vivos 
gifts made in 1924 and after applied retroactively to gifts made in 1924 prior to the enactment 
of the law. Justice Holmes, in his concurrence, cited by Chief Justice Roberts, found that a 
prospective rather than retrospective reading of the statute was reasonable. Id. at 148–49. 
Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648 (1895), involved a California statute that barred foreign 
insurance companies from selling policies within the state, where the defendants asserted that 
they procured a policy outside the state of California and that the challenged statute unconsti-
tutionally restricted the purchase of a policy outside the territory of California. The Court 
rejected the reading of the statute that the defendants offered, preferring a reading that only 
barred the sale of policies within the state and finding that the sale had occurred within Cali-
fornia because the defendant brokers were California residents. Id. at 656–57. Parsons v. 
Bedford, 28 U.S. 433 (1830), required the Court to determine if a statute directing Louisiana 
district courts to follow the procedures of that state resulted in an unconstitutional grant of 
authority to the Supreme Court to reexamine facts by requiring the Court to follow Louisiana 
procedures. The Court determined that the general language of the statute should not be given 
such force as to result in such a violation. Id. at 448. 
 77. This calls to mind the words of Oliver Wendell Holmes regarding the interpretation 
of the law from the perspective of a bad man. As Holmes wrote:  
But what does it mean to be a bad man? Mainly, and in the first place, a prophecy that if he 
does certain things he will be subjected to disagreeable consequences by way of imprison-
ment or compulsory payment of money. But from his point of view, what is the difference 
between being fined and taxed a certain sum for doing a certain thing?  
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, The Path of the Law, in THE PATH OF THE LAW AND THE COMMON 
LAW 1, 6–7 (Kaplan Publ’g 2009). 
 78. Richard Hasen, A Few Thoughts on the Chief Justice and Healthcare Decision from 
SCOTUS, ELECTION LAW BLOG (June 28, 2012, 9:13 AM), http://electionlawblog.org; Nicho-
las Rosenkranz, Roberts Was Wrong to Apply the Canon of Constitutional Avoidance to the 
Mandate, SCOTUSREPORT (July 11, 2012, 8:36 AM), http://www.scotusreport.com. 
 79. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2600-01. 
 80. Id. at 2593. 
 81. Vermeule, supra note 8, at 1949. 
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Ultimately, the avoidance canon has little practical effect on the indi-
vidual mandate.82 In other cases, such as those cited by Chief Justice Rob-
erts,83 the canon restricted the function of the statute so that it might have 
had an actual, demonstrably different effect depending on the Court’s inter-
pretation. The lack of any practical difference between the individual man-
date before and after the application of the avoidance canon sets this case 
apart in the canon’s history. 
IV. THE CHIEF JUSTICE’S USE OF THE CANON IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
Chief Justice Roberts applied the avoidance canon in a very unusual 
way. This section seeks to place that unusual method of application into the 
historical context of the avoidance canon, looking first, in section A, to see 
if the Chief Justice managed to actually avoid any constitutional issues. Sec-
tion B then looks at the unusual situation faced by the Chief Justice to de-
termine whether this new methodology had merit. Finally, section C looks to 
the dissenting and concurring opinions in NFIB v. Sebelius to address the 
criticisms each had for the Chief Justice’s avoidance canon jurisprudence. 
A. Whether Roberts Truly Avoided a Constitutional Question 
One of the key provisos of a proper application of the modern avoid-
ance canon has always been that the Court should avoid a constitutional 
question where possible.84 In NFIB v. Sebelius, Chief Justice Roberts faced 
arguments for upholding the individual mandate under the Commerce 
Clause, the Necessary and Proper Clause, and as an exercise of Congress’s 
power to lay taxes.85 Faced with these interpretive alternatives, the Chief 
Justice determined that the mandate, while unconstitutional under the Com-
merce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause, was a constitutionally 
permissible tax.86 
The avoidance canon does not provide for a case such as this. As de-
scribed above, the avoidance canon rests on the idea that there exists a way 
to resolve the issue before the Court without resorting to constitutional ques-
  
 82. The Chief Justice did acknowledge that those who choose to pay the penalty rather 
than acquire health insurance would be in compliance with the law, rather than being “out-
laws,” NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2597, and, while this might be of some comfort to those who 
would not wish to be branded as such for non-compliance with the mandate, the overall prac-
tical effect is still that the taxpayer must either buy insurance or pay the government. 
 83. See supra note 74. 
 84. Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 237 (1998). 
 85. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2584. 
 86. Id. at 2591–93, 2600. 
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tions.87 The three possibilities presented to the Court as methods for validat-
ing the individual mandate all implicated constitutional questions. To that 
point, the Chief Justice, after determining that the Court could interpret the 
mandate as a tax, still had to address the issue of whether Congress could 
pass such a tax as the Shared Responsibility Payment.88 As the Chief Justice 
observed, “[e]ven if the taxing power enables Congress to impose a tax on 
not obtaining health insurance, any tax must still comply with other re-
quirements in the Constitution.”89 The challengers argued that the individual 
mandate violated those other requirements.90 
This presented a unique situation. Other cases in which the Court has 
applied the avoidance canon involved interpretations that managed to avoid 
altogether the addressing of a constitutional question.91 In this case, no mat-
ter which avenue the Chief Justice selected, a constitutional question await-
ed.  
In this peculiar instance, the avoidance canon could not have its usual 
operation. The canon fails at its second and third steps. No method of adju-
dicating the controversy in this case could avoid the simple fact that the 
Court had to determine the constitutionality of the individual mandate, 
whether under the Commerce Clause, the Necessary and Proper Clause, or 
as an exercise of the taxing power. The Court faced the need to avoid a con-
stitutional question but could only do so by addressing another, equally seri-
ous, constitutional question. The Chief Justice recognized this impasse, and 
he devised a way to adapt old tools to a new use. This note now turns to that 
solution. 
B.  Whether the Unique Questions Before the Court Required a New Solu-
tion 
As the Chief Justice could not apply the modern avoidance canon to the 
individual mandate, and his explanation and application seem a bit strange 
to begin with, it seems that he may have adapted to the case by creating a 
new canon. 
The uniqueness of the Chief Justice’s situation required a new method-
ology, or, rather, a new use for an old methodology. The Chief Justice 
seemed to define his avoidance canon with great focus on decisions that 
utilized the classical avoidance canon.92 As the Court faced three choices, 
  
 87. Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concur-
ring). 
 88. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2598. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. See supra note 76 and accompanying text; supra Part II.A.; supra Part II.C. 
 92. See supra Part III.A. 
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each with constitutional implications, the modern avoidance canon, which 
focused on simply not answering the question,93 could not help the Court 
come to a decision. The Chief Justice had to answer a constitutional ques-
tion. 
This seems the most likely reason for the Chief Justice’s reliance on 
classical avoidance canon precedent. By applying the classical avoidance 
canon, the Chief Justice could make a decision; alternatively, applying the 
modern avoidance canon would have placed him at an impasse. Even so, 
one cannot properly term the Chief Justice’s approach as classical avoidance 
canon, because even that version of the canon requires that the alternative 
interpretation not implicate a constitutional concern. Rather, the Chief Jus-
tice established a similar method for addressing those situations in which the 
Court must choose one of two or more methods of adjudicating the constitu-
tionality of a statute—where all the choices available implicate constitution-
al questions. 
The Chief Justice first determined the constitutional questions before 
him. Although the opinion does not say as much, the Chief Justice would 
have determined that no method of addressing the issue existed that would 
not avoid a constitutional question. Indeed, all the arguments presented to 
the Court involved constitutional questions. The Chief Justice then looked to 
each of his constitutional alternatives to determine whether there existed a 
statutory construction that would validate the statute under each respective 
constitutional provision. Having found such a validating construction, the 
Chief Justice would have then determined whether such a construction 
would be contrary to the intent of Congress. 
This method of analysis requires that the question before the Court be 
unavoidably constitutional in nature but possibly constitutional under alter-
nate constructions relying on different constitutional theories. Such an inter-
pretive canon resulted here in a statute going largely unchanged in its actual 
function, a result that surely must meet with the approval of the legislators 
who passed the bill. Despite Justice Scalia’s concerns that this construction 
served to rewrite the statute,94 the resulting statute bears a closer relation to 
that originally passed than other statutes interpreted under the avoidance 
canon.95 
The Chief Justice failed to properly apply the modern avoidance canon 
largely because the modern avoidance canon could not apply to the question 
before him. Instead, he utilized the precedent of the classical avoidance can-
on to craft a tool that could address exactly the situation he faced. 
  
 93. Vermeule, supra note 8, at 1949. 
 94. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2655 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 95. Rosenkranz, supra note 78. 
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C.  The Dissenting and Concurring Criticism of the Chief Justice’s Opin-
ion  
Justice Scalia’s dissent takes issue with the majority opinion’s interpre-
tation of the individual mandate as a tax, believing that “to say that the Indi-
vidual Mandate merely imposes a tax is not to interpret the statute but to 
rewrite it.”96 Justice Scalia does not take issue with the Chief Justice’s use of 
a modified version of the avoidance canon, as he himself states that “we 
must, if fairly possible, construe the provision to be a tax rather than a man-
date-with-penalty.”97 Considering the unique application that the Chief Jus-
tice used, first answering a constitutional question before interpreting the 
individual mandate as a tax, it seems somewhat odd that the dissent would 
not address what appears at first blush to be an improper application of the 
canon. 
The oddity of the Chief Justice’s application of the canon did not go 
unnoticed, however. Justice Ginsburg, in her concurring and dissenting 
opinion, questions Chief Justice Roberts’s holding that the individual man-
date overreaches under both the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and 
Proper Clause while upholding it as a tax.98 The Chief Justice responded to 
that question in saying that “[i]t is only because the Commerce Clause does 
not authorize such a command that it is necessary to reach the taxing power 
question.”99  
The separate opinions approach their criticism in different ways. While 
the Scalia dissent agrees with the approach that the Chief Justice takes while 
disagreeing with the conclusion,100 the Ginsburg opinion disagrees with the 
approach while supporting the conclusion.101 Justice Ginsburg saw no reason 
to engage in a “Commerce Clause analysis that is not outcome determina-
tive.”102 However, as observed above, the Court faced no way to avoid a 
constitutional question. With no way to avoid the question, Chief Justice 
Roberts first addressed the most natural reading of the statute before resort-
ing to alternative readings.103 Considering that dilemma, addressing the more 
natural reading of the statute first would allow the Court to avoid unneces-
sarily addressing questions that it would otherwise have no reason to decide. 
In this light, the Chief Justice’s assertion that “[w]ithout deciding the Com-
merce Clause question, [he] would find no basis to adopt such a saving con-
  
 96. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2655 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 97. Id. at 2651. 
 98. Id. at 2629 n.12 (Ginsburg, J., concurring and dissenting). 
 99. Id. at 2600. 
 100. Id. at 2651 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 101. Id. at 2629 n.12 (Ginsburg, J., concurring and dissenting). 
 102. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2629 n.12 (Ginsburg, J., concurring and dissenting). 
 103. Id. at 2600. 
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struction” makes significantly more sense.104 Justice Ginsburg’s suggestion 
that the Chief Justice engaged in an unnecessary Commerce Clause analysis 
mistakes outcome determinativeness for a proper avoidance of issues. In that 
regard, Justice Scalia’s opinion seems to more fully understand the Chief 
Justice’s method and the dilemma faced by the Court. If the Court had first 
analyzed the individual mandate as a tax in order to save it from an unfavor-
able Commerce Clause, it would have run afoul of another principle of 
statutory interpretation—the plain meaning rule—which requires the inter-
preting Court to give the words of a statute their ordinary meaning.105 The 
Chief Justice managed to avoid that issue by confronting the constitutional 
issues head-on with a newly adapted avoidance canon. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion in NFIB v. Sebelius appears at first 
glance to apply a canon of statutory interpretation that has a pedigree ex-
tending beyond Marbury v. Madison. A deeper reading of the opinion re-
veals that the Chief Justice did not face a situation that he could adequately 
address using the tools at his disposal. The modern avoidance canon offers 
no succor to those whose only alternatives to a constitutional question are 
other constitutional questions, and the classical avoidance canon cannot 
truly apply because, similarly, once the Court answers the question of con-
stitutional validity based on one interpretation, it cannot then select an alter-
native reading that does not invoke the Constitution. 
The Chief Justice has provided guidance to future courts faced with the 
prospect of deciding whether a statute validly falls under one constitutional 
provision or another but where no non-constitutional grounds for a decision 
exist. Far from misapplying the old tools of statutory interpretation, the 
Chief Justice demonstrated a great talent for the innovative use of existing 
precedent to create solutions to new and complex problems. 
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